When the European Council Intervenes: Bargaining Success in EU Legislation

Despite the EU treaties limiting the European Council (EUCO)’s role to providing the Union’s general political direction, several observers have documented its active intervention in several high-profile dossiers negotiated under the ordinary legislative procedure. This article builds on that insight asking: to what extent does the EUCO affect legislative outcomes? We examine whether EUCO intervention systematically increases the bargaining success of the Council at the expense of the European Parliament. We combine the DEU III and IV datasets with a dataset on EUCO conclusions, matching the national leaders’ attention to legislation with the positions of the other EU actors. Our findings are mixed. While the impact of EUCO’s involvement on bargaining success is not statistically significant, the effect is both significant and substantial when the focus is restricted on legislation related to core state powers. The findings bear important implications for democratic politics in the EU.