The article examines the conceptual and normative “riddle” posed by art. 6 of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) in defining “high-risk” AI systems (h-AISs). It argues that the combination of a horizontal, tech- nology-neutral framework with a risk-based classification generates sig- nificant interpretative uncertainty and undermines legal certainty. After situating the AIA within the broader EU product-safety regime and the New Legislative Framework, the contribution meticulously examines in detail the critical issues arising under Art. 6 AIA. These range from para. 2 recalling the Annex III list of high-risk AI systems, which does not rest on an objective assessment of risk, to the exceptions in paras. 3 and 4, and the cross-reference to Union harmonisation legislation in Annex I. Par- ticular attention is paid to contested notions such as “safety component” and “third-party conformity assessment required”, illustrated through case studies (e.g. security mobile robots, humanoid robots, drone docking stations). The article concludes that this unstable definitional architecture undermines consistent application, equal treatment across sectors, and ef- fective incentives for innovation.
The Brussels Sphinx’s Riddle. What is a high-risk AI System?
Andrea Bertolini
;Federica Fedorczyk
;Marta Mariolina Mollicone
;Guilherme Migliora
2025-01-01
Abstract
The article examines the conceptual and normative “riddle” posed by art. 6 of the EU Artificial Intelligence Act (AIA) in defining “high-risk” AI systems (h-AISs). It argues that the combination of a horizontal, tech- nology-neutral framework with a risk-based classification generates sig- nificant interpretative uncertainty and undermines legal certainty. After situating the AIA within the broader EU product-safety regime and the New Legislative Framework, the contribution meticulously examines in detail the critical issues arising under Art. 6 AIA. These range from para. 2 recalling the Annex III list of high-risk AI systems, which does not rest on an objective assessment of risk, to the exceptions in paras. 3 and 4, and the cross-reference to Union harmonisation legislation in Annex I. Par- ticular attention is paid to contested notions such as “safety component” and “third-party conformity assessment required”, illustrated through case studies (e.g. security mobile robots, humanoid robots, drone docking stations). The article concludes that this unstable definitional architecture undermines consistent application, equal treatment across sectors, and ef- fective incentives for innovation.| File | Dimensione | Formato | |
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